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Chapter 9 
.#In and of Itself Nothing Is Finite" 
Schelling's Nature (or So-called Identity) 
Philosophy 
Michael Vater 
When Ficbte and Schelling parted philosophical company early in 1802, 
the chief reason was their inability to come to agreement on the nature of 
transcendental phiJosopby after Kant While they both eschewed Kant' s 
term· transcendental argument, by which Kant meant a grand hypothetical-
deductive structure that went beyond empirical concepts and hypotheses 
and secured the possibility of a unified and systematic field of experience1 
and instead u·sed the word 'construction' that Kant used for mathematical 
procedures,2 they disagreed considerably on the nature and scope of philo-
sophical construction.3 
Ficbte, in revisions to the Jena Wissenschaftslehre publically announced in 
the 1797/98 Philosophical Journal which be published, argued that in fulfill-
ing the invitation to "think oneself' the thinker gains access to a territory prior 
to any divide between subject and object, where thinking and acting coin-
cide.4 In this self-reversion, Ficbte finds an alternative to the quasi-objective 
'self-positing' that was introduced as system-principle in a epistemic or 
hypothetical-deductive way in the 1794/95 Grundlage; he now calls it intel-
lectual intuition, an intuition or immediate consciousness of self-positing as 
positing or self-reverting activity.s The thinking of oneself initiated by the 
summons (or intellectual stimulus) to ' think oneself reveals the agility of 
self-reverting thought, the ability to tear oneself out of a prior state of repose 
and initiate novel activity (Kant' s noumenal freedom)--or to slide from the 
function of being 'c oncept' to that of self-constituting 'intuition.' 6 In the self-
positing revealed in intellectual intuition, the knower is actor, and the agent 
is real insofar as it realizes itself in folding back upon itself. The intuition that 
establishes itself in this way is 'one' or sui generis; empirical selves may be 
deemed multiple in a derivative social context where 1-hood is inferred from 
sensory intuitions of behavior, but self-activity or self-consti tution as such 
19 J 
192 Michael Vater · 
is unique. From Fichte's point of view, then, there is simply no predication 
possible of anything like an I or its activities to anything that is not capable 
of thought and free action. 
The same year that Fichte announces that alterations to bis system 
are underway, Schelling begins to explore the possibility of an idealistic 
philosophy of nature or, as he will later call it, a speculative physics. Schell ing 
is at pains in the philosophical reflecti ons that bookend the specific con id-
eration of natural phenomena such as magnetism, light, and gravity in the 
1797 Ideas fo r a Philosophy of Nature to indkate that philosophy of nature 
is a human undertaking, hence a work of freedom, but that its object is oot 
dead matter or things unseen, in the manner of Kant' s things-in-themselve ? 
Schelling acknowledges that while be ought to deduce the possibility of 
nature or an aU-inclusive platform of experience, the idea of philosophy is 
itself the result of philosophy, and that of a universaLly valid philosophy 
is as yet "an inglorious idea1."8 Lacking an a priori starting point, Schelling 
offers instead a historical-critical introduction to those parts of physics and 
chemistry that can be accommodated by the idea of opposed forces and their 
equilibrium. The general problematic that philosophy of nature must work 
out is a solution to the problem of realism and idealism. Neither a dogmatic 
system that thinks our knowledge is grounded in causation by external 
objects, nor a Kantian account of causality from the side of the subject, 
will suffice. Both Spinoza and Leibniz provide two-sided solutions, but not 
grounded in human activity. The ideal of a productive or genetic account is 
borrowed from Fichte' s early jdeas on the form philosophy can take, and the 
idea of objective purposiveness embodied in organic nature provides a vision 
of where a philosophy of nature should go.9 The very idea of a philosophy 
of nature, however, remains problematic: "Nature should be Mind made vis-
ible, Mind the invisible nature. Here then, in the absolute identity of Mind 
in us and Nature outside us, the problem of a possibility of Nature external 
to us must be resolved." 10 
Two years later, with the publication of the First Outline of the System of 
the Philosophy of Nature, Schelling views the problematic character of the 
new discipline as surpassed, for the unconditioned is now seen to be pre ent 
in nature as infinite activity, and nature is viewed not as a field populated by 
self-subsisting things, but by apparent products or actants, the outcome of 
Limitations.11 Transcendental philosophy alone has access to the absolute or 
unconditioned, and that implies that it finds its principle not in any single 
being, nor in the total aggregate of beings, but in being itself. Any Jesser 
domain, if it is to be a science, must similarly encompass being itself, not 
aggregates of beings. 12 So the philosophy of nature will take the form of an 
ongoing deduction of forms of limitation upon unconditioned activity, and be 
capable to some degree of being integrated into a transcendental philosophy 
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built on the same model-a scheme followed in great detail by the 1800 
System of Transcendental Idealism. 
Evidently it is sufficient for Schelling in 1799 that nature is active and 
composed of finite processes rather than dead extended stuff in order to guar-
antee that nature is originally dynamic and to confer ' transcendental' status 
on the philosophy of nature. If all primitive qualities are agents or "actants," 
somethings which are more like Fichtean 'strivings' than atoms of Cartesian 
'extension,' matter can then be 'constructed' out of a plentitude of inhibited 
actants, each of which is a filling of space and not a cutting out of a patch 
of pre-existent space. Putting vanishing agency behind observable products 
makes the field of actants (or actants-become-products) into a form that 
empiricism can recognize: "The philosophy of nature has nothing to do other 
than to recognize the unconditionally empirical in these actants. Empiricism 
extended to include unconditionedness is precisely philosophy of nature."13 
The filling of space is the very definition of matter, and matter in all of its 
evolved configurations is the field of nature. 
On one level, the dynamic atomism of the First Outline is quite fertile. 
The 1797 Ideas got stuck at the level of organic nature, for its basic construc-
tion was a mechanical atomism. The Outline is able to straightaway tackle 
that which is the ultimate problem for a mechanism, namely, life, and to 
append a construction of the inorganic to the primary deduction of the organ-
ism. Schelling's primary construction is quite ingenious-a field of incessant 
change which evolves regulative parameters, where change itself is both the 
principle of lawfulness or order and the agent of disruption, and the ratios 
of actant to product determine the emergent qualities in nature. Nature as a 
whole is an absolute organism, but its singular instances are more or less 
mutant and only by being realized (or 'produced') all at once approximate 
the ideal and form a continuum of species which are not chronologically or 
developmentally related.14 
The crucial question, however, is whether the process philosophy of the 
First Outline is 'transcendental, ' or whether the upsurge olf atomic activities 
postulated behind natural qualities is sufficiently active to qualify as activity 
in Fichte's sense-self-positing, self-reverting agility. There seems to be a 
difference between the activity that Fichte claims one can empirically experi-
ence in the dyadic situation of responding to the summons "think yourself," 
in which case two singular instances of I interact on an empirical level, but 
only the respondent feels the transition between repose and activity, and the 
indefinite multiplicity, perhaps infinity of actants postulated by Schelling to 
explain matter and its states. {1) On an empirical level, Fichte can say, much 
like Gertrude Stein quipping about Oakland that "there's no there there," that 
there is oo 1 or self-reversion enacted in Schelling's hypothetical plenum of 
'little bangs. • (2) Schelling bas a metaphysical problem which be explicitly 
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encounters in the 1801 Presentation of My System, namely, explaining the 
positing of being as such as infinitely many individual beings or actants 
without having the systematicity problem Jacobi diagnosed as the fatal flaw 
of Spinozism, namely, "egress from the absolute." But Ficbte also has a 
problem: (3) Whether and how the 'foot on the accelerator' feeling of agil-
ity corresponds to self-constitution or the unrestricted activity indicated by 
the first fundamental principle of the 1794 Grundlage. Put bluntly, what is 
to distinguish transcendental argument from the unanchored metaphors of 
science fiction ? 
THE FICHTE-SCHELLING CORRESPONDENCE 
ln the course of making some practical arrangements for a united forum or 
institute for transcendental idealism in the wake of Kant' s 1799 repudiation 
of the Wissenschaftslehre, Fichte and Schelling are forced to confront djf-
ferences that bad arisen in their philosophical outlooks since 1795. While 
residing together at Jena they regarded each other as friends and colleagues 
embarked upon a common project, securing the Critical philosophy from 
skeptical attack and providing a single systematic form to communicate il. 
When Fichte resigns his position at Jena over the 'atheism' controversy and 
moves to Berlin, an exchange of letters begins that shows tbe two thinkers 
moving in opposite directions in their common effort to erect a system of 
transcendental idealism. Building on hints given in the Vocation of Man, 
Fichte wants to expand the Wissenschaftslehre's ethically based theory of 
cognition in a theological direction, amplifying the check or summons that 
determines and ultimately individuates me in social-ethical interpersonal 
interaction to a theory of interdetermination in an invisible or 'intellectual ' 
world, a community of spirits}5 Schelling had been moving in an opposite 
direction, toward a philosophy of nature based on idealistic principles, where 
action was primary and not mere mechanic mQtion, and where a dynamic or 
speculative physics would explain the corporeal or material dimension of the 
individual I's circumscribed agency and cognition. While Fichte' s new direc-
tion was largely aspirational, by 1800 Schelling had turned the categorical 
apparatus of action and limitation of the First Outline into a motor for the 
elaboration of a comprehensive theory, the System of Transcendental/deal-
ism. That work cleverly made the finite subject's cognitive apparatus into an 
evolution of stages of nature, joined the idealism of the Wissenschaftslehre 
to it as a second part, a social philosophy-etbics-pbilosophy of history, and 
crowned the whole construct witb a treatment of aesthetic intuition or artistic 
genius. A sort of objectivism pervades the whole work: activity cannot appear 
except as limited, or as exhausted in its product. The first-person point of 
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view, implicitly guiding the whole Fichtean project of exhibiting the real-
ity of will and its free act as the foundation of the phenomenal world, had 
seemingly disappeared. 
When Fichte upbraids him for the naturalistic tone of the whole project 
and for the inclusion of a segment on the philosophy of nature in par-
ticular, Schelling's reply is that he is engaged in an enlargement of the 
Wissenschaftslehre, having set off in a direction tangential to the circum-
scribed territory of the finite agent and her social and moral life, but with 
the hope of returning to its first principles having enlarged its territory.16 The 
agent in Fichte's philosophy, which Schelling calls the ideal subject-object, 
is but a higher exponent or power of a more basic form of subject-object 
identity, the real ground of nature.17 Schelling's choice of metaphors bor-
rowed from geometry and mathematics is not accidental; both philosophers 
appeal to geometry, with its conceptual necessity founded upon an intel-
lectual seeing that in tum depends on a process of sensible in tuition-the 
construction of exemplary lines and figures-for a model of bow philoso-
phy's work-construction in intellectual intuition- must proceed. 18 What 
Schelling fails to do, either for the reader or for Fichte, is to argue for the 
basis of the similarity between the moral circle of Wissenschaftslehre and the 
newly drawn tangent of Naturphilosophie, or between the higher power of 
subject-object identity we directly experience as moral agents and the sort of 
agency that nature exhibits in the dynamic motion that makes nature cohere 
as a dynamic system, or potentially a universal self-regulating organism. One 
would have to read Schelling's essays in the philosophy of nature almost as 
carefully as their author to get the point, but the vitalistic view of motion in 
nature as self-originating and self-regulating bas been implicit in the First 
Outline and 1800/01 General Deduction of the Dynamic Process and is 
underscored by Schelling's pejorative comments on mechanism and Newto-
nian experimental science in the lengthy presentation of the philosophy of 
nature in the 1801 Presentation of My System. The essence of mechanism, 
readily seen in Descartes and Spinoza, is the belief that physics can deal 
only with imparted motion or kinetic energy and is in no position to give an 
account of originary motion. The idea of a self-moving sphere or a cosmic 
animal whose movements and processes are self-regulated was not foreign 
to ancient physics, but it drops out of modem physics. Moderns like Fichte, 
and probably the author and readers of this piece, simply cannot see any 
similarity between the motion of a natural object, the behavior of the animate 
being, and the conduct of a cognizant subject. Only if there is an aspect of 
Kantian willing-initiating a new line of causality in the phenomenal world, 
independent of what preceded-on view in the world will Schelling's idea 
of a basic subject-object identity that can be raised to a higher exponent or 
reduced to a lower one gain any traction.l9 
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THE NATURPHILOSOPHIE OF SCHELLING'S 1801 
PRESENTATION OF MY SYSTEM 
In the course of their discussions in 1801 Schelling sentFichte both volumes 
of his Journal for Speculative Physics and asked him to pay speciaJ atten-
tion to the Deduction of the Dynamic Process and to the Presentation of My 
System. While the latter might be viewed as a public statement responding to 
items under discussion in the letters, its preface makes but a passing reference 
to the question of whether Ficbte and Schelling are on the same path. It was 
actually skepticaJ questions about the possibility of an idealistic treatment of 
nature and its independence from other philosophical domains posed by Karl 
Eschenmayer' s review of the First Outline that occasioned the Presentation. 20 
We need but look to a few points about the Presentation. its preface, and 
the basic mode.l of being relative to individual beings that is propounded in its 
initial section. Schelling maintains that what be has published hitherto, both 
the tentative essays in the philosophy of nature and the more polished presen-
tation of transcendental philosophy-including ethics and social philosophy, 
philosophy of history, and aesthetics-have been but one-sided glimpses of 
a larger systematic view privately held. This view is the 'indifference-point' 
between nature and spirit and it bas not been on display in earlier works.21 In 
the closing words of the preface, Schelling calls his comprehensive metaphys-
ics ' the System of Identity' ;22 in later years be will often assert that be used 
this term once only, in an extra-systematic context, and that the Presentation 
and the works and lectures following on through 1806 were really part of the 
larger project of Naturphilosophie. 23 
The system that Schelling offers in the Presentation postulates that, foreign 
as the procedure is to most persons in most aspects of their lives, thinking 
inhabits a domain of reason governed by the law of identity (A = A) that 
expresses the logical sameness or ultimate congruence of subjectivity and 
objectivity. From that point of view, aJl phenomena or concrete entities 
are seen to involve a deviation or a doubling\ a dissociation of factors such 
that what is intrinsically real (A = A) seems to exist as indefinitely muJtipJe 
instances of (A= B), relative being. Properly understood, each relative being 
is an identity or an association of subjectivity and objectivity, rather than tbeir 
indifference, and not just any difference, but a difference (A = B) inflected 
one way of the other, as +A = B or as A = B+ and so more or less subjective 
or more or less objective.24 
So far it might seem as if the notation, not the philosopher, was doing all 
the talking. But A= A is not a dry logical formula; it is an identity of identity 
and expresses the ultimate congruence of infinite being and infinite know-
ing. If there is such an ultimate congruence, it must express itself infinitely 
in such a way that it exists and knows itself only in and as the interaction 
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or interdependence of endlessly many finite beings. In the Spinozistic per-
spective that Schelling employs in this work, being is power and cannot not 
express itself. If it is infinite power, it exists as endlessly many finite beings, 
each of which is infinite or identical in itself, and whose fimtude or differ-
ence is self-annihilating in agency and cognition-sex and love don ' t make 
the short list until 1803/04. For our purpose of understanding the workings 
of nature, it is important to realize that nothing is finite in itself, or that 
every individual entity, properly understood, is infinite.25 The sorts of rela-
tions, frameworks, motions, and processes that nature concretely puts before 
the philosopher demonstrate the merely apparent or vanishing nature of 
finitude-or the obsolescence of the individua1.26 
Schelling translates the evaporating nature of the finite or the hiddenness 
of its infinitude within appearances into a language that be thinks is precise, 
so precise that it can be translated into mathematical notation and even given 
geometrical expression. If the absolute is the primal indifference of subjectiv-
ity and objectivity, every finite instance of it is a distortion of identity by dif-
ference, or an inflection of indifference toward relatively greater subjectivity 
or objectivHy: every A= A~ A= B, either as +A= B orA= B+. The notation 
should make it perspicuous that the difference between the absolute and the 
finite individual is unreal or a matter of semblance, and that the difference 
between individuals can be quantitative, never qualitative. 
Tbis yields a grid of four possibilities for ontology: any two items can be 
qualitatively different or inclifferent, or quantitatively different or indifferent. 
There is no qualitative difference. Quantitative clifference distinguishes the 
'subjects' and 'objects' of appearance, and also groupings of things rela-
tively subjective vis-a-vis groupings of things relatively objective. There is 
no explaining what we now call the ontological difference: both being and 
beings, finite individuals and the absolute, are the same-identity or indiffer-
ence, only nuanced by a positive or negative quantitative label which is extrin-
sically attached. All of this gets packed into one formula: the absolute and the 
universe, or totality of individual finite entities. are identical or qualitatively 
indifferent, while individuals relative to one another are quantitatively differ-
ent, as well as groupings or classes of individuals (powers or potencies) that 
are likewise quantitatively different from one another. Nowhere is there any-
thing qualitatively different. Quantitative indifference obtains in the whole or 
in the totalities relative to their members (in the potencies), and quantitative 
difference obtains between inclividuals and between potencies contrasted to 
one anotber.27 There is simply no explaining how quantitative indifference 
appears as quantitative difference, or bow reflection sees things differently 
than reason-evidently this is the price one has to pay for being a systematic 
monist. Schelling's attempt at precision and perspicacity here must be judged 
a failure. for Fichte, who took careful notes while reading these theorems, 
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straightaway accused Schelling of having introduced clifference, quantitative 
difference, into the absolute-the very thing he was trying not to do.28 
Schelling proceeds to the deduction (or construction) of the chlef features 
of nature by deploying two overlapping explanatory schemes: (1 ) the powers 
or potencies of relative identity appearing in the guise of clifference, where 
the first has objectivity preponderant, the second subjectivity or .ideality, 
and a third wherein they are equated or reestablished in relative identity, 
and (2) the ontological expressivity or degree of reality of the three powers: 
relative identity, relative duplicity, and relative totality. The items grouped 
under these principles are no t 'bodies' or discrete chunks of matter, nor little 
monadic minds; the A = B's or apparent instances of difference which stand 
out from the embracing identity which is their sole reality are the shadows of 
identity distorted, each an entity, so to speak, having a mental and a phys.i-
cal dimension. A's and B's don' t exist independently; there are no atomic or 
corpuscular bodies or disembodied little minds, and there is no Newtonian 
aquarium space to contain them or en tropic stream of becoming to temporally 
push them along. In their dense self-expression, they establish and occupy 
the dimensions of space; in their ex-istence they establish the first existent, 
matter. They act out, as it were, the possibil ity for identity and difference 
between one item and another: linearity or the line posited by relative identity 
and difference of A and B, angularity or the dissociation of one line from 
another, and their synthesis in depth or clissociation returned to relative iden-
tity. If these items are the dimensions of matter, they are simultaneously the 
construction of space and the occupation of that space.29 Being is dynamic or 
self-realizing-presumably this is what Plato meant by defining it as power, 
Spinoza as endeavor to exist, and Leibniz as appetition. 
Let us consider Schelling's treatment of one main feature of natural orga-
nization in 1801, the deduction of gravity. Matter is a realization of A = B; 
it is fl uid and non-localized. One of its components or tendencies is infini te, 
active, and empiricalJy invisible: A, the so-called cognizing or associating 
factor; the other is limited, resistant, objective. The second corresponds to 
what Kant called resistant force, the firs t to bis hypothetical attracti ve force. 
Schelling decided back in 1799 that either these two had to work upon some 
pre-existing chunk of materiality or that they bad to be yoked by a compre-
hensive third force, the force of gravity. Various regions of matter (the fluid 
universe) will be characterized more by repulsion or attraction; only the total-
ity will be gravity in its state of equilibrium, the basis of nature's being. But 
thls account is too simple, as static as a mathematical equation. The dynamic 
element of gravity is that the simple analysis obtains only if A and B are 
posited as real, as dynamically opposed in any one patch of the primary exis-
tent-or among any two patches.30 This sets up a chicken/egg problem for all 
of nature: is gravity primary and the associated factors derivative? Or are the 
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A's and B's primary and their association or identification derivative? And 
how exactly are the A 's and B' s said to be both 'real ' in this first potency? 
There seems to be an indecision here at the basis of being: to be continu-
ous or to be discrete? Does reality in its very material basis suffer from a 
Hamlet-complex at the quantum level? That Schelling at this stage chooses 
to introduce a distinction be does not clarify until1809, that of being and the 
ground of being, is not helpful. The problematic nature of gravity (one item? 
two? three?) does motivate the elaboration of connection and individuation at 
higher levels, but there seems to be a root difficulty in trying to map the three 
elements of the cognitive situation (knowing, knower, known) onto the three 
aspects of gravity (equilibrium, attraction, repulsion). 
If one steps back and reflects on what Schelling has done here in the first 
step of the construction of nature, one can see that Nan.trphilosophie is not 
philosophy of science or some intellectual reconstruction of the findings of 
empirical science. It is dynamic or speculative physics. Schelling's interest is 
not in isolated beings or dead entities analyzed down to their ultimate physical 
components, but the vital pulse of nature (Spinoza's natura naturans) that 
underlies its mute thereness and materiality (natura naturata). The pseudo-
things that mechanistic physics takes as the glue that holds its particles 
together: gravity, light, the dynamic polarities seen in magnetism, electricity, 
conduction, are the real 'things' of nature-not the work of occult 'forces' but 
the expression of the power of identity to overcome the shadow difference of 
individuation or particularity. From the standpoint not of empirical observa-
tion and experiment, but of the imaginative (or in-folding) insight of intel-
lectual intuition, finitude undoes itself and is seen to be a willful withdrawal 
from interdependence, community, or life in what Schelling starts in 1802 to 
call idea-that which is seen by mind, not by sensible eyesight.31 
If the goal of Naturphilosophie is to reveal life, complexity, and metamor-
phosis, then there will be something at work in it that is inimical to defini-
tion, fixity, and segregation of phenomena from one another. Nature does not 
operate as a duchy, church, or university. Redundancy in strategies and expla-
nations will make a linear and hierarchical account impossible, while overlap-
ping accounts threaten the human taste for simplicity, elegance, and paucity 
of hypotheses. While Schelling does not yet embed a principle of anarchy 
or 'irreducible remainder' in the bowels of nature, it is not just the tangle of 
axiomatic deductions that make this text difficult, but the variety of primi-
tive processes that are now and then adopted as explanatory models. There 
is a simple enough homology that displays itself in the major order or levels: 
gravity, with its coupling of repulsive and attractive forces; light~ with its 
passage through translucent bodies and its refraction from opaque; and mag-
netism, with its polarity and reversals of polarity, display a simple taxonomic 
skeleton. Cohesion in various bodies, variances in mass, and the resistance of 
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phenomena such as conduction of beat or electrici ty to kinetic explanations, 
or of chemical interactions to a simple alterity or oxidation or deoxidization 
all work counter to the imposition of simple schemes. And Naturphilosophie 
must also deploy these organizational schemes while at the same time reflect-
ing the disorder of the current findings of empirical disciplines. 'Develop-
ment' in nature is a somewhat contradictory idea too, for in Schelling's time it 
meant the elaboration of Stufenfolge, an archaeological stratigraphy of nature 
instead of an evolutionary history.32 The whole endeavor itself has to be situ-
ated in the history of science and the history of philosophy, which lends the 
whole enterprise a certain quaintness or irrecoverability. 
Naturphilosophie in the 1803/04 Complete System of Philosophy 
ln lectures delivered at Wtirzburg in 1803/04 Schelling returned to the 
Spinozism of the 180 1 Presentation, thls time providing extensive com-
mentary on theorems which were there presented in the all too brief style 
of axiomatic derivation. The problematic language of the earlier exposition, 
with its turgid vocabulary of 'quantitative indifference' and 'quantitative dif-
ference,' is replaced by a view of reality as self-expressive or affirmation, an 
identity (or copula in propositional terms) of affirming and what is affirmed. 
The two systematic requirements, unity of principle and completeness of 
explanation, coincide so that the identity of God and the universe is evident 
and Jacobi 's constraint met-that there be no 'egress from the absolute' or 
derivation of concrete individuals that exis t outside the embrace of the abso-
lute. These goals cannot be met, however, without reinterpreting the individu-
als of the expressed universe as ideal entities, ideas, while the apparent ' real ' 
things of experience or finite individuals are seen to be self-sundered from 
their ideas, their systematic context, and hence· deceptive imitations of the 
ideal order. In their ersatz self-positing, finite individuals declare a pseudo-
independence and translate the absolute's all-at-once expression of reality 
inside the potencies into a temporal succession or a scission between pos-
sibility and actuality, making each individual a private history of the world, 
or a history of the world from one very determinate location.33 Once again, 
Naturphilosophie occupies the bulk of the lectures and does the heavy argu-
mentative lifting: if our senses seem to present us with discrete independent 
items, and our empirical sciences exhibit law-like interconnection among 
them, consideration of nature from reason's perspective shows that finitude 
is a vanishing determination. Upon inspection, what at first presents itself as 
being turns out to be merely the ground of being. 
The System's treatment of God or absolute identity that Schelling offers in 
1803/04 is tightly argued from premises both epistemological (the identity of 
knower and known in knowing) and metaphysical (God is expressive or an 
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affirmation that is both affirming and what is affirmed). The key point is that 
when, or if, human cognition lays aside jts subjectivity or point of view in 
intellectual intui tion, reason coincides with the absolute's self-affirmation.34 
And this divine self-affirmation is not merely logical or a mathematical 
theorem. It is self-realizing or powerful, a conquest over the possibility of 
nonbeing: 
The fo rm of the absolute affirmation of [and] by itself which constitutes the very 
essence of the absolute is . .. repeated in reason and its light reveals how we 
grasp the absolute, true and proper mediation between itself and knowledge . ... 
[T]he idea of God in the spiritual world is the first affirmation of all reality; 
there is no reality other than that whk h exists and which is affirmed by virtue 
of the idea of Him, yet this idea has no affirmation outside itself; it is its own 
affirming and affirmed. The absolute light, the idea of God, strikes reason like a 
flash of lightning, so to speak, and its luminosity endures in reason as an eternal 
affirm ation of knowledge. By virtue of this affirmation, we grasp the eternal 
impossibility of non being that can never be known nor comprehe nded, and the 
ultimate question posed by the ve rtiginous intellect hovering at the abyss of 
infinity: "Why [is] something rather than nothing?", this question will be swept 
aside forever by the necessity of Being, that is, by the abso]ute affirmation of 
Being in knowledge. 35 
One might can this passage Schelling's ' llitchcockean moment,' the onto-
logical argument reconfigured as a cliff-hanger, played in the philosopher's 
home-theater and projected by the Malebranchean internal light. This is the 
point whence the most extreme conception of Schelling's later metaphysics 
takes its origin : that the divine is free over against being. even free to exist 
or not exist. Henceforth Schelling's philosophical imagination continually 
yokes being with nonbeing-always a moment that is not merely puzzling or 
self-contradictory, but "vertiginous." 
General Naturphilosophie: The Construction of Nature 
or the Real Universe 
Non being continues to play an important part in the Wtirzburg System , which 
among all of Schelling's many texts on Naturphilosophie has the peculiarity 
of placing a general philosophy of nature ahead of a more specific consider-
ation of natural phenomena. General (or ontological) philosophy of nature 
displays the role of nonbeing, or merely relative being, in nature's particular 
entities, for the particular exists in a double (or indecisive) way-both in the 
idea, hence in God, and 'in itself' or in the double frameworks of shadow 
alterity: space and time, gravity and light, motion and rest, and contraction and 
expansion. In treating these shadow frameworks, Schelling crafts a picture of 
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nature from mechanistic elements derived from Spinoza's and Kant's phys-
ics and from vitalistic elements borrowed from Leibniz, for the particular 
in nature is monadic in character: a kernel of spontaneous or self-originated 
agency beclouded by the passivity enforced by its external relations to other 
particulars. Indeed the external realm of particulars is like a rainbow, a refrac-
tion of the light of infinite substance through the prism of nonbeing; the 
individual item, the particular that both subsists in the idea and exists in itself. 
is like the double-image Goethe produced in one of his optical experiments, 
which involved viewing a lighted object directly through a prismatic lens.36 
Space, time and causal interrelation are of course the formal characteristics 
of appearances, as Kant said, but rather than their being empty a priori intu-
itions, they are shadows cast by being tha t has opted to live outside the abso-
lute or to hide its infinity. Though these formal characteristics are amenable 
to numeration and can be accounted magnitudes, actual infinity has nothing to 
do with endless or indefinite numeration, argues Schelling, citing Spinoza's 
example of the actual infinite as the incommensurable areas of two circles, 
one of which contains the other, but neither of which bas the same center. The 
infinity of matter is first directly seen in the organism, in its self-regulating 
or homeostatic character-or its being a dense system of systems.37 That the 
finite individual finds itself placed in endlessly enumerable space and time 
and finds its ever-perishing substance only in causal relations to others simi-
larly situated is an index of its privative status, its pertaining to nonbeing. 
Motion, if it is spontaneous, is the interforming (lneinsbildung) of time and 
space, but mechanical motion is but externally imparted force exerted upon 
mass or the bare impenetrable stuff that fi lls space. Mass or the occupation 
of space by merely inertial matter (Masse) is the most degraded exhibition 
of spontaneity or self-movement. The inertial thing exhjbits not the rest (or 
motion) of substance, but only passivity, "an mborn imperfection, like an 
original sin of matter. n 3S 
Newton's physics considers space, Lime, matter, gravity and light to be 
independent items of nature, separately quantifiable and interrelated only 
through mathematical models. Schelling's treatment of these parameters 
finds them all intertwined and ontologically based. Gravity is not a case of 
externally imparted motion, or motion o f one finite body relative to another. 
Each quantum of material mass is related to the center, to the infinite sub-
stance of nature which is its ground; in this grounding of the apparent motions 
of individual bodies relative to one another one finds "the true system of pre-
established harmony." Schelling criticizes Newton's postulation of attractive 
force and Kant' s hypothetical construction of matter from repulsive and 
attractive forces; credit goes to Franz von Baader, instead, for positing gravity 
as an independent and substantial thing, one of which attraction and repulsion 
are specific attributes. The 'Law of Gravity' that physics seeks is not to be 
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found in extrapolation from Kepler's laws of the motion of planetary bodies 
but in a mathematical-ontological postulate: "every point [in nature] is the 
mid-point.,.39 It is futile to search for gravity as a discrete empirical phenom-
enon, for it is the hidden ground of nature: 
The ground of gravity is thus the uncliscoverable depth of nature itself that can 
never step into the light of day, since it is that through wruch everything is born 
wruch sees the light of day, the mysterious night or fate of everything, or the 
maternal principle of things, since things subsist jn it as the ground in which 
they are conceived and from which they are bom.40 
If gravity is the ground of the reality of things, light is their cause; gravity 
is the same in all, the identity of essence, or bare particularity, while light is 
the principle of distinction or in-sich-selbst-Seyn.41 Time and number, which 
is abstracted from it, are merely apparent features of phenomena, which are 
simply eternal in the absolute. When the particular is posited in space or 
withdraws from the eternity of absolute identity, the future is established as 
the real dimension of time: the negation of totality, the past as the negation of 
unity, and the present not as their identity but as their mere non-difference. 
Time is being's eternity in diaspora, a product of imagination, not intuhion.42 
Special Naturphilosophie: Construction of the Particular 
Potencies of Nature 
The previous section treated the universal frameworks of nature; its treatment 
of the dual nature of the particular corresponds to the metaphysical deduc-
tion of individuals in the 1801 Presentation. Wbere that work talked of the 
particular or individual entity in terms of identity's appearing as quantita-
tive difference, the Wtirzburg System speaks of relative being and nonbeing 
that constitutes the particular, or the cloaking of intrinsic or spontaneous 
activity of the monadic instance under the guise of externally compelled or 
mechanical motion. 
In the present section, Schelling has a more complicated picture of nature. 
its organization, and its products. There are the three powers or potencies of 
nature (as in Schelling's other essay in the philosophy of nature) displayed 
in the three dimensions, and further divided into form and substance. Inor-
ganic nature is depicted in the first two powers, with the first or more or less 
objective power displaying a centrifugal movement from unity to totality, or 
metamorphosis; the second more or less subjective power displays a reverse 
or centripetal movement, a return to unity that is denominated dynamic 
process.43 Under •form' are ranged the familiar objective features of nature, 
formerly displayed under the title ' dynamic process': cohesion, magnetism, 
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electricity, and chemical transformation. Under 'substance' (Substanz, not 
Wesen.) are ranged four processes of transformati on or development (com-
prising the Evolutionsreihe): earth, fire, air, and water in the first or objective 
potency, and phenomenological properties such as sound, light, and warmth 
in the second or subjective potency.44 All the properties and processes dis-
cussed are ideal, or features of nature as it appears to us; nature bas no objec-
tive or in-itself properties-the so-called elements that empirical chemistry 
attempts to isolate-for nature is but the one substance or matter appearing 
under different powers or exponents.45 
I have presented these features in more or less the reverse order that 
Schelling derives them, for I want to call attention first, to the dynamic 
language of Schelling's categories and classifications such as Evolution and 
Metamorphosis, and secondly, to the way all the processes be discusses point 
to the third potency, organism, and in particular to discussions of physiology 
that are new to this presentation of the philosophy of nature: sound, light and 
warmth are phenomena for beings so organized as to have ears, eyes, and 
skin capable of registering variations in temperature. Nature appears only to 
the kind of particular being capable of perceiving its activities and processes. 
If there were no subjects of perception, there would be no nature. The per-
ceiving subject, however, is in nature as a part of nature-or as nature folded 
back upon itself. Says Schelling: 
Simply considered, absolute substance is not intuiting; it is pure intuition. Only 
in connection to the organism is it mere intuiting. In sensibility the innennost 
and most holy reaches of nature are thrown open as it were, and its true essence 
brought to light. Here the student might learn to turn at tltis point of the con-
struction back to the fundamental axiom for the construction of the essence of 
nature, which reads: As affirmed, the essence of nature is to be affirming, in infi-
nite ways. At this point, where it appears as such in concreto, this will doubtless 
become wholly meaningfu1.46 
At this point, Schelling' s reader might well turn back to the beginning of this 
section on special philosophy of nature and examine the twelve axioms that 
Schelling advanced for understanding the metaphysics of nature. One might 
see there an eclectic mix of elements borrowed from Plato, Spinoza, and 
Leiboiz, but one might better see a struggle to craft a metaphorical language 
free of precise reference to extension, force, imaging, perception, subjectivity 
or biological life but fundamental enough to support all these overlays upon the 
primal ontological deed: affirmation or expression-or perhaps articulation.41 
The vocabulary available to Schelling is at once too tied to particular domains 
of nature, Life, or mind and too pallid to express the 'decision' or 'leap' from 
nonbeing into being that is the core of things' originating in while springing 
forth from being's sheer power. The need to create new language or violentJy 
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appropriate the modes of speech of past thinkers-or to do both at once--will 
characterize Schelling's later thought, and while there is something irritating 
about it, it is at least resourceful when compared to the 1801 Presentation's 
drab palette of mathematical and geometrical properties and logical relations. 
The ontological thinker is forced both to borrow and break the language of 
others and will end up looking like both anarchist and plagiarist. 
With this in mind we can turn to Schelling's axioms for nature: 
1. Similar to infinite substance, nature is the identity of affirnting and 
affirmed, expressed in the exponent of objectivi ty or the real. 
2. Nature is in itself the creative and productive idea, though it appears as 
merely produced or created. 
3. The items that compose nature stand to nature itself as things do to 
infinite substance. 
4. In each thing or form of expression, a universal core (Wesen) is joined to 
a particular form. 
5. The core reality of the things of nature is the true idea, but subjected to 
the form (or style) of ' reality' in material things. 
6. If a thing is not or does not contain its own identity, it is subject to an 
external identity as its ground. 
7. There is no causal interaction among things; each is a microcosm. 
8. Things are joined interoalJy, as Leibniz expressed it in his notion of petite 
perceptions. 
9. Finite things maintain their particular being by preserving a constant 
ratio of rest to motion, or being affirmed to affirmation, or limitation to 
position. 
10. This constant relation or homeostasis is maintained by reciprocal or 
interdependent change. 
11. Both in substance and expression, the part of nature and its totality are 
the same. 
J 2. Everything in nature pertains to the being and idea of infinite substance.48 
Nothing in the above list of axioms is (or ought to be) surprising. Each axiom 
bas historical precedents in the histories of philosophy and of physics. Each is 
broadly true of material nature and can be extrapolated to express the char-
acteristics of both the organism and mind. And each is relati vely bum-drum: 
philosophy may start in wonder but ought not conclude to the astonishing. 
In particular topics of Naturphilosophie, the Wtirzburg system is innovative 
in its tendency to argue that the higher-order phenomena of living systems 
replicate the movement between polar opposition and identification seen in 
the lower-order phenomena of the dynamic process: magnetism, electric-
ity, and chemical transformation, without imposing a single explanatory 
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paradigm. as Goethe djd with expansion and contraction in the morphology 
of plants.49 Schelling does take over Goethe's term metamorphosis, however, 
as a label for the centrifugal activity of the whole first or finite potency, where 
successive forms of activity are viewed as accidents of a constant 'matter.' 
In the second or infinite potency, termed dynamic activity, there is a constant 
centrifugal activity whiJe various chemical 'matters' come and go; activity 
occurs in the different for the sake of identity and the restoration of identity.50 
The same two comprehensive or general potencies, considered as at rest rather 
than in motion, focus on the chemical process where two series of processes-
one productive of 'seltbood,' another destructive of stability, and their joint 
product are likened to the composition and decomposition of hydrogen and 
oxygen in water. There are no primitive ' matters' or elements in nature such 
as empirical chemistry was beginning to establish, only one substance under 
various exponents or potencies. 51 One can poetically speak of four proto-ele-
ments or processes, as did various ancient Western and Eastern cultures: earth 
(the soul of selfbood), phlogiston or air (dissolution), water (the antithetical 
principle) or nitrogen, and fue (all-consuming dissolution) or oxygen.52 
There seems to be something quaint or highly philosophical (as opposed 
to 'empirical' ) in the explanations Schelling advances here. Even when the 
same levels of phenomena are explained in a more 'nuts-and-bolls' way 
via cohesion, gravity on the micro scale, Schelling argues that all physical 
explanation can be translated into the language of 'chemism,' and the latter 
interpreted in terms of cohesion. But differences in cohesion are explained 
not by any change in substance, but only an al teration of form. The so-called 
elements advanced by empirical chemists are produced merely by changes 
of state in the one perduring matter, one form supervenient upon another. 53 
At a crucial point of summary and transition, S.chelling makes clear that to 
this point he has offered two sorts of explanation, one in terms of substance 
and another in terms of process or form. So the first or finite potency is 
exhausted in the dual orders of cohesion, on the one hand, and the transfor-
rnative cycle of elements or 'matters' on the other. The same t.h.ing happens 
in the second or infinite potency. except be has to this point mentioned only a 
real series or dynamic activity: cohesion, magnetism, and electricity. To this 
is added a series of alterations in the ideal order where magnetism appears as 
sound, electricity as light, and chemical dissolution as warmth. 54 Bringing all 
these four sets of explanations together, Schelling speaks of the scaffold of 
nature as the "evolutionary series of matter," including matter's appearance. 55 
Naturphilosophie is at the threshold of phenomenology; the table is set for 
the arrival of the subject. 
Throughout the constructions of the Special Naturphi/osophie Schelling 
repeatedly says that matter is one and that the hierarchy of forms that nature 
evolves is one sole process, formation or the in-formation of the universal 
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and the particular. Put another way, the universal process is depotentiation or 
the resolution of apparent solidity and separateness of entities into the ideal-
ity of fire, which is warmth, light and life.56 This nee-Aristotelian hylozoism, 
which is decidedly philosophy of nature, not philosophy of science as we 
know it, strives to display biological life and the life of mind at the center 
of nature-the so-called anthropic program. Fundamental to this program is 
the display at higher reaches of nature of the coalescence of particularity and 
universality, gravity and light, light and life. 57 The key piece of evidence for 
this ambitious construction (we might say reconfiguration) of nature is the 
organism where an inbuilt teleology turns activity back upon itself in self-
sustaining configurations; Schelling says of the organism that it depends not 
on the (apparent) substance of its matters or components, but on their acci-
dents, whereby the part or function subsists only in and with the whole. This 
structure gives rise to a self-directing or self-programming purposiveness, 
the very opposite of the linear teleology bwlt into a machine from without.58 
Schelling's discussion of the organism is too complicated to follow in 
detail here, but it follows the pattern of earlier discussions where the organ-
ism is assigned three levels or exponents of realization: reproduction, irrita-
bility, and sensibility. Reproduction is viewed as a higher form of cohesion, 
with respiration, secretion, and assimilation likened to organic versions of 
magnetism, electricity, and chemical interaction. Sexual reproduction in 
dimorphic plants and animals points toward the spiritual domain; in the firs t, 
each could be absolute but instead seeks the absolute in its other, while in 
love each person could be the totality but instead wills the other and seeks it. 59 
Goethe's paradigm of expansion and contraction is appropriated to treat 
topics in embryology and physiology. Muscular movement exhibits both 
activities. The circulation of blood in the arteries and veins is also explained 
by this alteration; it is the first dimension of irritability, while the second is 
respiration, and the third voluntary muscular movement arranged symmetri-
cally in the dimension of breadth.60 
Sensibility is the place where subjectivity breaks out in the organism; the 
nature of the identity of affirming and affirmed points toward the ideality of 
nature as a whole. In the forms of sensibility, absolute substance becomes 
pure intwtion, pure seeing, and the inner life of matter is revealed as the 
identity of being and perception.61 
Perceptivity is not something accidental in matter, it is its essence or very sub-
stance, since the core being of matter is idea. Perception and substance are not 
joined as items standing alongside each other, as if matter were somehow dou-
bled; the being of one directly is the other. This is the chief thing to understand 
not just here in this construction, but in the whole doctrine of matter. Matter as 
matter is already perceptivity.62 
208 Michael Vater 
There is at times something forced or a little too ingenious in Schelling' s 
inclusive classifications. That sound is extended to cover touch and the latter 
to include taste is one instance, but that sensory primacy is given to bearing 
rather than to sight as the first organic interplay of the finite and the infinite 
seems appropriate, given that thought is nested in language and .. [l]anguage is 
the most sublime thing in nature, the word made flesb."63 But naturalism need 
not mean vulgar or reductive materialism. Schelling is enough of a materialist 
to see that thought is located and, as it were, embodied in the brain, and that 
the intersubjective world of spirit is similarly located in language (Sprache). 
At this point the objects of science and philosophy (and religion) coalesce, 
for the human is the place where depotentiated identity-or the absolute 
itself-is mirrored, where the natural and spiritual worlds join. A new natural 
cience is needed to study this 'human-organism,' says Schelling-and today 
this makes one wonder whether our neuroscience and artificial intelligence 
can make do as the ' scientific anthropology' be calls for. For a philosophi-
cal construction can only identify homo sapiens as the end of nature and the 
beginning of the intellectual (geistige) world, the being that, while not exactly 
existing as the center or at the center of a planetary system, is itself the living 
center of the cosmos.64 
Schelling bas more or less done what he promised Fichte be would do: 
bring the tangent of naturalism back to the circle of idealism; there is a 
construction of the ideal world in the Wtirzburg system, but it is brief and 
uneven and ends with a Hegelian apotheosis of the state. There is undoubt-
edly too much analogical reasoning and too little empirical evidence behind 
Schelling's constructs for our tastes, but it is both surprising and hearten-
ing that in the end his gaze rests on the inner or invisible spaces where we 
think the ·holy of holies' lies: the brain inside ~s and the web of language 
between us. 
NOTES 
1. A95-96/Bl3l- 36. 
2. A71 3/B741- A718/B746. 
3. Speaking more carefully. one must say that Kant offered transcendental deduc-
rions of various jtems in ills theoretical and practical phllosopbies and used the tenn 
transcendental idealism to refer to his whole epistemological theory. lt offers an anti-
skeptical justification of the use of human reason on a priori grounds, arguing that 
various levels of subjective unification or synthesis are necessary conditions for the 
possibili ty of experience. A transcendental argument is one that argues in two di rec-
tions: from X being a necessary conctition of Y, and from Y not only being possjble, 
but being the case, to the X being the case. Where Y is as comprehensive a thing as 
human experience. the argument will be very broad. 
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Fichte offers a careful explanation of the procedure near the end of his 1797 First 
Introduction [to the Wissenschaftslehre], and one as broad as Kant's, for he insists that 
one is able by this means to arrive at "the system of all necessary representations," or 
experience as a whole (IWL, 31-32). 
Paul Franks has recently called attention to the oddity of Kanll.'s insistence 
that reason forms a system, and that philosophy's main challenge was to provide a 
philosophy of everything. That everything can be explained from one thing or a slim 
set of coherent principles is a theological (or onto-theological) assumption- no longer 
widely made by philosophers. Philosophizing in Kant's wake, Ficbte and Schelling 
face an absolute challenge: explain all or nothing. See Franks, All or Nothing, 368-72. 
4. IWL, 109ff. 
5. IWL, 11 3-15. 
6. IWL, 11 6-18. 
7. lPN, 58. For a philosophically provocative account of Schelling's earlier essays 
in Naturphilosophie, see Grant, Philosophies of Nature after Schelling, particularly 
chapter 6: "Dynarrric Philosophy, Transcendental Physics," 187-98. 
8. lPN, 9. 
9. lPN, 28-3 1. 
10. lPN, 42. 
11. FO, 16. 
12. FO, 13. 
13. FO, 22. 
14. FO, 48-50. 
15. VM, 105-9. Evidently this idea of a common transcendent Will that provides 
to a multiplicity of finite or individuated wills the vehicle for the knowledge of and 
action upon one another is what Fichte tries to communicate to Schelling in the dif-
ficult sketch for future revisions of the Wissenschaftslehre that he penned in the sum-
mer of 1801 and sent to Schelling on August 8. See Correspondence, in PRFS, 56-58. 
See also Vater, "Erkenntnis and Interesse." 
16. Correspondence, PRFS, 45-46. 
17. Correspondence, PRFS, 44. 
18. Cf. PRFS, 94-98 and 207-1 1. 
19. Franks views the problematic nature of intellectual intuition as central to the 
letters' cti scussions . When the tenn was first introduced by Fichte in his rev:iew of 
Aenesidemus in 1794, it denoted access to the I's self-constitution: I am because I am. 
If Ficbte now wishes to detach it from the first-person perspective and find in it access 
to a self-grounding that is shared by all finite subjects, but not exhausted by them, the 
intuition is problematic, almost as problematic as Schelling's stretching it to a third-
person stance, a spontaneity equally on view in nature's organization and the finite 
subject's agency. See Franks, All or Nothing, 340, 364-65. 
20. Schelling published Escbenmayer's critique-"Spontaneity = World-Soul, or 
the Highest Principle of Naturphilosophie"-in the first issue of the second volume 
of his journal in 1801, and his Presentation of My System in the second. For a more 
detailed discussion of the latter and particularly of the identity-theory propounded in 
its first fifty theorems, see Vater, "Schelling's Philosophy of Identity and Spinoza's 
Erhica nwre geometrico." 
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Eckan Forster views Eschenmayer 's challenge to Schelling's right to assume 
the s tance of being nature's creator, and Sche lling's reply that intellectual intuition 
allows insight into a sort of self-constitution which, while associated with agency and 
personality in Lhe finite subject (the highest power), can be 'depotentiated' (or have 
its exponent reduced) to s imply being the agent in nature, as one of the two crucial 
points of the Presentation's metaphysics of identity. Intellectual intuition involves an 
"abstraction," an intentional laying aside of subjectivity. See Forster, The Twenty-Five 
Years of Philosophy, 241-48, 285. 
2 1 . Presentation, PRFS, 141-42. 
22. Presentation, PRFS, 145. 
23. Schelling, On the H istory of Modem Philosophy, 120. In contrast, a lengthy 
treatment of the philosophy of identity that Schelling offers in his first lectures on 
the philosophy of revelation in Berlin (1841142) emphasizes the metaphysics, not the 
natural philosophy, of the earlier period and credits it wilh three lasting achievements: 
(J) attaining lhe status of a purely rational or a priori philosophy, (2) showing that all 
the entities it considered were merely relative beings, admixtures of being and what 
ough t not be. and (3) deducing as its result the idea of God or the absolute, but in no 
way touching upon its reality. See Schelling, Philosophie der 0./fenbarung, 111- 21. 
24 . Presellfation , PRFS, 145-47, 158- 59. 
25. Presentation. PRFS, 150-52. 
26. Only if individuals exist solely inside the absolute can the systemaUcity 
requirement for Spinoza's monism as formulated by Jacobi- no egress from the 
absolute- be maintained of indefinitely many finite instances of being-and-knowing. 
Schelling tersely states this and comments that it is self-evident (Presentation, PRFS. 
151 ). Schelling gets around this awkwardness in his 1804 Wtirzburg lectures on 
The Complete System of Philosophy, where he returns to Spinoza's Ethics once again 
and offers expansive explanations instead of the cryptic theorems of the Presentation, 
by making the individual or item of appearance a dissociation of the panicularity 
and universality of the idea as it is expressed in the absolute, de fining ontological 
singularity in terms of privation or non-being. See Schelling, System of Philosophy in 
General, 175-82. 
27. Presentation, PRFS, 155- 58. 
28 . Correspondence. PRFS, 66. 
29. Presentation, PRFS, 158--64. 
30. Presentation, PRFS, 164-66. 
31. See Further Presentations, PRFS, 211 - 16. From this point of view, it is the 
presence of 'Romantic dig ressions' in the steady march of the axiomatic deduction 
of 'scientific facts' that shows its author's real intentions and view s. The polemics 
directed against "atomists" and " physicists," the scorn poured upon the disciples 
of Newton who frame hypotheses and design discrete experiments, the quixotic 
defense of Goethe's ideas of the 'unity of light' and lhe vanishing nature of color 
in his color-theory, and finally the adoption of Goethe's term metamorphosis for 
the basic chemical process of oxidation and deoxidization show that Schelling's 
interest is directed to inte rrelations, processes and transformations in nature, not 
discrete elements. See Presentation. PRFS, 174-80. Evidently, Sche lling found 
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Goethe's attempts at illfuitive science more interesting than Goethe found Schelling's 
Naturphilosophie. See Steigerwald, "Goethe's Morphology," 291-300. 
32. See Steigerwald, "Epistemologies of Rupture." 
33. See Schelling, System of Philosophy in Genera~ 175-82. In the course of 
1802 Schelling came to see that the true individuals of the identity-system are ideal, 
organic individuals that in themselves establish ideality and reality, or universality 
and particularity, in equilibrium, and hence that the pseudo- 'individuals' g rasped by 
perception and reflective cogitation are ' fallen ' from that organic particularity into a 
ecJuded fonn of individual existence. This withdrawal from the absolute is just the 
reverse of the self-positing of the Wissenschaftslehre; it is limitation or the simultane-
ous positing of I and not-1, the shadow of the absolute's complete and powerful self-
affirmation. See Further Presentations, PRFS, 215- 16; see also SW 6:246-52. 
See Whistler, Schelling's Theory of Symbolic Language, 90-100, for a cogent dis-
cussion of the issues Schelling faces in formulating the theory of ideas and the various 
models he employs to communicate their trans-finite s tatus. 
34. See Introduction, PRFS, 13. 
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47. Schelling cJarifies the ' affirmation ontology' of the 1803/04 Wtirzburg Com-
plete System in his 1806 essay On the Relation of the Ideal and the Real in Nature, 
or Developmem of the First Principles of Nature-philosophy from the Principles of 
Gravity and Light, where he emphasizes the dynamic quality of the connection-das 
Band or the copula-compared to the relatively static items it connects: what affirms 
and what is affirmed, or the ideal and the real, or substance (Wesen) and framework 
(Form). See SW 2:259-61. A translation of this key text by lain Hamilton Grant is 
fonhcoming. 
48. System, SW 6:278-81. 
49. See Forster, The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy, 271- 76. 
50. System, SW 6:317-21. 
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